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Blasting injuries in surface mining with emphasis on flyrock and blast area security
Abstract
Problem:  Blasting is a hazardous component of surface mining.  Serious injuries and fatalities
result from improper judgement or practice during rock blasting.  This paper describes several
fatal injury case studies, analyzes causative factors, and emphasizes preventive measures.  
Method:  This study examines publications by MSHA, USGS, and other authors.  The primary
source of information was MSHA’s injury-related publications.  Results:  During the 21-year
period from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly explosive-related injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for
surface coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for surface metal/nonmetal mines 10.76
(95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14).  Flyrock and lack of blast area security accounted for 68.2% of these
injuries.  This paper reviews several case studies of fatal injuries.  Case studies indicate that the
causative factors for fatal injuries are primarily personal and task-related and to some extent
environmental.  A reduction in the annual injuries in surface coal mines was observed during the
ten-year period of 1989 - 1998 [5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) compared to the previous ten-year
period of 1979 - 1988 [10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 - 14.14)].   However, such reduction was not noticed
in the metal/nonmetal sector, i.e., 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the period 1989-1998
compared with 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 - 14.89) for the period 1979-1988.  Discussion:  A
multifaceted injury prevention approach consisting of behavioral/educational,
administrative/regulatory, and engineering interventions merits consideration.  Impact on
industry:  The mining community, especially the blasters, will find useful information on
causative factors and preventive measures to mitigate injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast
area security in surface blasting.  Discussion of case studies during safety meetings will help to
mitigate fatal injuries and derive important payoffs in terms of lower risks and costs of injuries.
Keywords:  Blasting; Mining; Explosives; Injuries; flyrock; blast area security
1.  Introduction
Mining is a hazardous occupation.  The average annual rate of fatal injuries (number of fatal
injuries per 100,000 workers) in the mining industry (30.3) exceeds that of all other industries,
such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing (20.1), construction (15.3), transportation and public
utilities (13.4), and manufacturing (4.0).  In addition, the average number of days lost (ADL) per
incident in the mining industry exceeds the ADL of all other industries (NIOSH, 2000).  While
cognizant of the inherent dangers, explosives are essential in breaking rock.  Surface mines in
the coal and metal/nonmetal sectors rely extensively on explosives to uncover mineral deposits. 
The mining industry considers blasting an essential component for the success of their
operations.
1.1.  Explosives used in surface mine blasting
More than 90% of the domestic explosive and blasting agent formulations generally used are
ammonium nitrate (AN) based (USGS, 2000).  A mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil,
commonly known as ANFO, gained acceptance for blasting at surface mines.  The major
advantages of ANFO are related to safety, economy, and ease of handling when compared to
nitroglycerine (NG)-based high explosives.  Various forms of NG-based high explosives were
used in surface blasting before the introduction of ANFO.  During the past two decades, ANFO
formulations have undergone numerous innovations to improve performance, shelf life, density,
porosity, specific energy, and water resistance.  Since its introduction, ANFO has replaced many
grades of dynamites and other high explosives.  Hundreds of patents related to improvements of
ANFO and its loading procedures have been filed at the U.S. Patents Office.  ANFO-based
explosives are now available in various sizes, styles, and consistencies.  Because of the diverse
mechanical and geological properties of rock and the unique conditions at each blast site, a wide
variety of products are available.  Free-flowing dry blasting agents, with the addition of finely
divided, flaked, or even granular aluminum, can be mechanically loaded in dry holes for
improved performance.  A variety of emulsified and gelled products are specifically designed for
wet blastholes.  Ingredients have been developed to improve density, rheology, sensitivity, water
resistance, and detonation velocity of packaged and bulk products.
Between 1990 and 1999, roughly 22.3 billion kg of explosives were used by the mining,
quarrying, construction, and other industries in the United States (USBM, 1991; USBM, 1992;
USBM, 1993; USBM, 1994;  USGS 1995; USGS, 1996; USGS, 1997; USGS, 1998; USGS,
1999; USGS, 2000).  Out of this, coal mining used 66.4%, nonmetal mining and quarrying
13.5%, metal mining 10.4%, construction 7.1%, and all other users 2.6%.
1.2.  Generic protocol for loading and firing of explosives in surface mines
Blasting is a complex activity demanding special skills on the part of the blaster and other crew
members.  It requires a careful coordination of tasks between the blasting crew and other
employees working in the vicinity of the blast site.  Before loading explosives in a borehole, the
blaster will generally examine the drilling logs to identify potential problem areas such as
presence of mud seams, voids, or geological anomalies.  This is followed by a visual inspection
of the highwall face and bench top.  The blaster should look for presence of overhangs, back
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breaks, softer stratum, and other irregularities.  Laser profiling data, if required, is examined at
this time.  Based on the approved blasting plan and the results of examination, the blaster will
calculate the charge weight, geometry, stemming, and other parameters.  Safety considerations
dictate that employees not associated with loading and blasting operations should leave the blast
site.  Blast sites should be secured and warning signs posted before loading boreholes.  The
blasting machine or the firing key should be securely kept by the blaster during the entire
process of loading and hook up to prevent any unintentional detonation.  The Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), Title 30, Part 56.6306 prohibits driving vehicles and equipment over
explosive material or initiating system.  The rise of an explosive column in a borehole should be
checked during the loading process.  The blaster should know and adhere to safe operating
procedures. The blaster or a designated employee should connect the individual holes to the
firing line.  It is a good practice to walk along the firing line to reexamine the connections.  If
any instrumentation for recording ground vibration and air blast has been deployed, it should be
checked and set at this time. 
Next, the blaster should clear all employees from the blast area, post guards at all entrances to
the blast area, and communicate to the mine foreman about the impending blast.  The blaster
(and helpers, if any) should go outside the blast area or stay inside a blasting shelter.  Upon
receiving clear and unambiguous feedback from the guards and mine foreman, blast signals are
sounded and the shot is fired.  Rock blasting releases a tremendous amount of energy in a very
short time span.  It is imperative to establish an effective protocol to maintain blast area security. 
Before sounding an all-clear signal, the blaster should conduct a visual inspection of the blast
site and check for undetonated explosives, misfires, and other problems.  The blasting log should
be finalized at this time.  Finally, all unused explosives should be returned to the magazine.
1.3.  Hazards of surface blasting
The hazards of surface blasting are primarily due to lack of blast area security, flyrock,
premature blast, and misfire (Verakis & Lobb, 2001).  Blasting generally entails two purposes: 
rock fragmentation and displacement of the broken rock.  The displacement of the broken rock
depends on the shot-design parameters, geological conditions, and mining constraints. 
Fragmented rock is not expected to travel beyond the limits of the blast area.  The blaster
determines the bounds of the blast area and is responsible for complying with safety laws. 
Langefors & Kishlstrom (1963), Roth (1979), and Persson et al. (1994) have developed theories
to compute flyrock range.  A blaster may use such concepts, in conjunction with past experience,
to determine the size of a blast area.
The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) defines flyrock as the rock propelled beyond the
blast area by the force of an explosion (IME, 1997).  An injury due to flyrock is sustained when
it travels beyond the blast area and injures someone.  The major factors responsible for flyrock
are insufficient burden, improper blasthole layout and loading, anomaly in the geology and rock
structure, insufficient stemming, and inadequate firing delays.  Injuries due to lack of blast area
security are caused by failure to use proper blasting shelter, poor communications, and
inadequate guarding of the blast area (Rehak et al., 2001). 




Mining injury and accident information was obtained from several sources.  Mine Safety and
Health Administration’s (MSHA) injury-related publications were used as the primary source of
data.  Reporting requirements for injuries, illness, and workplace exposures are stipulated in the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977.  MSHA’s accident investigation reports were used to gather
information on fatal injuries.  MSHA has categorized mining injuries in 21 classes based on the
circumstances which contributed most directly to the accident (MSHA, 1997).  Table 1 provides
a list of categories used by MSHA for accident classification.  Blasting-related accidents are
listed under class 4 (Explosives and Breaking Agents).
All pertinent information on loading and firing protocol of explosive charge was critically
examined during field visits.  Published information identified during the initial search was
screened using the criteria: (1) new technology and review of recent developments to mitigate
blasting injuries; (2) general information related to flyrock and blast area security; and (3)
reports of accident investigations.  Several publications by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM)
and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) were used for information relative to domestic explosive
consumption.
3.  Results
3.1.  Blasting injuries in surface mining
Forty-five fatal injuries were caused by explosives in surface mines between 1978 and 1998. 
Coal mines accounted for 19 (42.2%) of the fatalities; metal/nonmetal 26 (57.8 %).  A total of
367 nonfatal injuries occurred during the same period, averaging about of 17.5 injuries per year. 
Coal mines accounted for 167 (45.5%) of the injuries; metal/nonmetal 200 (54.5%).  Table 2 and
figure 1 show the annual distribution of fatal and nonfatal injuries for surface blasting in the coal
and metal/nonmetal sectors.  During the 21-year period from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly
injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for
metal/nonmetal mines 10.76 (95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14).  
The annual injuries for the ten-year period from 1979 to 1988 (Period-A) was compared with the
following ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 (Period-B) using GraphPad Software , Inc.’s1
(2002) online calculator for t-test.  The purpose was to examine if there was any reduction in the
annual injuries during the later period.
The mean annual injuries during the Period-A in coal sector was 10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 -14.14)
and 5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) for the Period-B.  The null hypothesis is based on the premise
that there is no difference in the annual injuries between these two ten-year periods.  The results
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of unpaired t-test for these two periods (DF = 18) are: p = 0.0190, t = 2.5770, and mean of
(Period-A minus Period-B) = 5.10 (95% CI: 0.94 - 9.26).  Therefore, the null hypothesis is
rejected.  The analysis indicates a statistically significant decrease in the annual injuries during
the Period-B compared to Period-A.
A similar unpaired t-test analysis was done for the surface metal/nonmetal mines, i.e., the mean
annual injuries during the Period-A in metal/nonmetal sector was 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 -14.89)
and 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the Period-B.  The results of unpaired t-test for these two
periods (DF = 18) are: p = 0.4141, t = 0.8361, and mean of (Period-A minus Period-B) = 1.70
(95% CI: -2.57 - 5.97).  The null hypothesis can not be rejected.  The resultant analysis does not
support any significant difference in the annual injuries during these two periods.
Table 3 illustrates the contribution of flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface mine
blasting.  Out of 412 blasting injuries (coal and metal/nonmetal), flyrock and lack of blast area
security accounted for 281 (68.2%) injuries. 
MSHA reported ten fatal injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface coal
and metal/nonmetal mines during the period from 1990 to 1999.  Appendix A provides brief case
study information about all these fatalities.
3.2.  Lessons learned from the fatal injuries
The energy released by an explosive charge in a borehole crushes the rock in the immediate
vicinity of the borehole, fractures the rock beyond the crushed zone, generates seismic waves,
creates airblast, and displaces the broken rock.  Any mismatch between the distribution of the
explosive energy, geomechanical strength of the surrounding rock mass, and confinement creates
a potential for flyrock.  Flyrock originates from the vertical highwall faces and also from the
bench tops.
Although the circumstances of each incident varied, some important similarities were observed. 
Deficiency or lack of attention to personal, task, or environmental factors has the potential to
cause injury.  Figure 2 provides a list of factors which play a role in successful blasting.
3.2.1.  Personal factors  The personal factors include education, job training, experience on the
job, experience on a related job, prior injury history, visual perception, overwork, load and blast
in a hurry, and  work-stress among others.  However, education, job training, and experience
play vital roles.  In case study 8, the victim had three days mining experience and very little
blast-hazard recognition training.  This employee placed himself and the visitor in harms way
due to lack of knowledge. 
A blaster should not be in a hurry or take any short cuts.  Taking short cuts or avoiding safe
operating procedures can result in serious injuries and often death.  In case study 2, we find that
the blaster took a short cut and went underneath a truck to detonate the blast.  After a misfire, the
blaster decided to detonate the shot from a closer distance.  A truck should not be considered as a
blasting shelter.
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3.2.2.  Task factors  Rock blasting necessitates an excellent coordination of a series of tasks. 
Some of the tasks are performed by the blaster while others are performed by the blasting crew
under the supervision of the blaster.  Several tasks are also performed by crews not related to
blasting.  The blaster should coordinate loading and firing activities with the mine foreman to 
ensure safety and efficiency.  Failure to properly coordinate the tasks can result in serious injury
or death.  The list of tasks includes examination of the driller’s log, inspection of the highwall,
and review of laser profiling data, if any.  The boreholes are examined for spacing, burden,
inclination, and general layout.  Case study 1 emphasizes the importance of these tasks.  The
next  task is clearing the blast site before priming, loading, and stemming the boreholes.  Once
the blastholes are loaded and ready, employees should be removed from the blast area or be
inside a blasting shelter.  Case studies 2, 4, 6, and 9 indicate the importance of using blasting
shelters. These fatal accidents could have been prevented by using blasting shelters. 
Guards should be posted at the entrance to all access roads leading to the blast area.  In case
study 5, an access road leading to the blast area was not guarded and an area resident
inadvertently entered the blast area.  This was a preventable accident.  Depending on the local
conditions, there may be additional requirements.  From the case studies, it was apparent that
poor implementation or coordination of tasks can cause a fatality.
3.2.3.  Environmental factors  The mining environment is often very harsh.  In addition to noise,
smoke, dust, and uneven ground it presents numerous other environmental hazards.  Movement
of large equipment such as draglines, shovels, dumpers, dozers, drills, and service vehicles
create distractions.  Often the blaster’s visibility is impeded due to large piles of overburden,
dirt, or blasted material.  Our study indicates that on several occasions, the blaster could not see
the blast area from the firing station and that resulted in fatal injuries.  An important
environmental factor, often overlooked, is geological anomalies.  Case studies 3, 7, and 10
illustrate the role of geological anomaly in causing flyrock injury.
4.  Discussion
During the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 a reduction in fatal and nonfatal blasting injuries
in surface coal mines was observed compared to the previous ten-year period.  However, in the
surface metal/nonmetal mining sector such reduction was not observed.
The accident data indicate that careless or improper blasting often caused fatal injuries.  The
injury prevention approach is invariably multifaceted.  This includes interventions conducted
through training and education, engineering controls, and administrative and regulatory
guidance. 
4.1.  Behavioral/educational interventions  Blaster training and education programs are
considered effective by many professionals.  In addition to initial training, a typical blaster
attends refresher training at regular intervals.  30 CFR, Part 955 mandates blaster training to
address safety issues related to storage, transportation, and use of explosive products.  The
course also focuses on blast design for different types of rocks commonly encountered in mining
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operations.  In addition, the training course provides information relative to the regulatory
requirements of explosives and blasting.
Several mining and blasting companies have instituted training programs for their employees. 
International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE) is in the process of completing several
training modules for blasters.  Modules for level one training are currently available and modules
for level two and three will be available soon.  A quality training program should address aspects
of modern blasting technology and explosive safety issues.
4.2.  Administrative/regulatory interventions   Federal and state regulatory agencies have
imposed strict requirements related to flyrock and blast area security issues.  30 CFR Part
56.6000 defines ‘Blast Area’ as the area in which concussion (shock wave), flying material, or
gases from an explosion may cause injury to persons.  The CFR also states that the blast area
shall be determined by considering the following factors:
•  Geology of material to be blasted,
•  Blast pattern,
•  Burden, depth, diameter, and angle of the holes,
•  Blasting experience of the mine personnel,
•  Delay systems, powder factor, and pounds per delay,
•  Type and amount of explosive material, and
•  Type and amount of stemming.
30 CFR Part 77.1303 requires that ample warning shall be given before blasts are fired, and all
persons shall be cleared and removed from the blast area unless suitable blasting shelters are
provided to protect persons endangered by concussion or flyrock from blasting. 
30 CFR Part 817.67 (c) requires that flyrock traveling in the air or along the ground shall not be
cast from the blasting site –
•  More than one-half the distance to the nearest dwelling or other occupied structure,
•  Beyond the area of control, or
•  Beyond the permit boundary.
Mining and blasting companies have instituted rigorous policies for flyrock control and blast
area security.
4.3.  Engineering interventions  Favreau  & Favreau  (2002), Preece & Chung (2001, 2002),
Dare-Bryan, Wade & Randall (2001), and Katsabanis & Liu (1997) have used numerical
simulation techniques to predict blast results by computing the interaction of rock and explosive. 
A blaster may be able to improve the design of a blast by using such simulation techniques.
Proprietary software developed by explosive manufactures are often available for consultation. 
Most of these design codes are capable of addressing variability of the rock type, depth,
diameter, delay, and spacing of boreholes.  In addition, some software programs will predict the
trajectory of the muckpile.  Sensitivity analysis and model studies, using computer simulation,
should be pursued prior to field blasting.  This would help the blaster examine the expected
outcomes and modify loading parameters, if necessary.
-7-
Engineering interventions are well understood by the blasting community and work well.  Dick
et al. (1983), D’Andrea & Bennett (1984), and Fletcher & D’ Andrea (1986) advocated the use
of portable blasting shelters.  The shelter is cylindrical in shape and constructed of heavy gauge
sheet metal and able to withstand potential impact from flyrock.  This portable shelter is
mounted on wheels or skids for ease of towing from one blast area to another.  The blaster enters
the shelter and closes the door prior to firing the shot.
5.  Conclusions
Blasting releases a tremendous amount of energy for fragmenting and displacing rocks within a
very short time.  The blast should be designed so that the energy released by detonation performs
useful work.  Any imbalance between the distribution of the explosive energy, geomechanical
strength of the surrounding rock mass, and confinement creates a potential hazardous condition
by channeling the energy through the path of least resistance.  Such imbalance can propel
flyrock beyond the blast area and create a potential for serious injuries and fatalities.  Case
studies listed in Appendix A underscore this issue.  Blasters should follow procedures required
by local, state and federal statutes to guard against catastrophic consequences.  
The principal factors attributed to the fatalities were personal, task and environmental. 
Intervention programs in the realm of behavioral/educational, administrative/regulatory, and
engineering merit serious attention.  During the ten-year period from 1989 to 1998 a reduction in
fatal and nonfatal blasting injuries in surface coal mines was observed compared to the previous
ten-year period (1979-1988).  However, in the surface metal/nonmetal mining sector such
reduction was not observed.
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Table 1.  MSHA Accident Classification
Class Source of Injury
1.  Electrical Accidents in which the electric current is most directly responsible for the
resulting accident.
2.  Entrapment Accidents involving entrapment of persons.
3.  Exploding Vessels Under
Pressure
Accidents involved with bursting of air hoses, air tanks, hydraulic lines,
hydraulic hoses, standpipes, etc., due to internal pressure.
4.  Explosives and Breaking
Agents
Accidents involving the detonation of manufactured explosives; includes
Airdox or Cardox.
5.  Falling, Rolling, or Sliding
Rock or Material of Any Kind
Accidents caused directly by falling material other than materials from the roof
or face. Or, if material was set in motion by machinery, by haulage, by hand
tools, or while being handled or disturbed, etc., the force that set the material
in motion determines the classification. For example, where a rock was pushed
over a highwall by a bulldozer and the rock hit another rock that hit and
injured a worker—the accident is classified as machinery; machinery (a
bulldozer) most directly caused the resulting accident.
6.  Fall of Face, Rib, Pillar,
Side, or Highwall (from in
place)
Accidents in this classification include falls of material while barring down or
placing props; also, pressure bumps and bursts. Not included are accidents in
which the motion of machinery or haulage equipment caused the fall either
directly or by knocking out support.
7.  Fall of Roof, Back, or Brow
(from in place)
Underground only - Accidents that include falls while barring down or placing
props; also, pressure bumps and bursts. Not included are accidents in which
the motion of machinery or haulage equipment caused the fall either directly or
by knocking out support.
8.  Fire Accidents related to uncontrolled burning of material or mineral in the mine
environment. Not included are fires initiated by electricity or by explosion of
gas or dust.
9.  Handling Material Accidents related to handling packaged or loose material while lifting, pulling,
pushing, or shoveling.
10.  Hand tools Accidents related to nonpowered tools.
11.  Nonpowered Haulage Accidents related to the motion of nonpowered haulage equipment. Included
are accidents involving wheelbarrows, manually pushed mine cars, timber
trucks, etc.
12.  Powered Haulage Accidents related to the motion of powered haulage equipment. Included are
accidents involving conveyors, front-end loaders, forklifts, shuttle cars, load-
haul-dump units, locomotives, railroad cars, haulage trucks, pickups,
automobiles, and personnel carriers.
13.  Hoisting Accidents involving cages, skips, ore buckets, and elevators. The accident
results from the action, motion, or failure of the hoisting equipment or
mechanism. Included are equipment such as cranes and derricks only when
used in shaft sinking; also, suspended work platforms in shafts. Not included is
equipment such as chain hoists, come-alongs, and winches.
Class Source of Injury
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14.  Ignition or Explosion of
Gas or Dust
Accidents resulting as a consequence of the ignition or explosion of gas or
dust.
15.  Impoundment Accidents caused by an unstable condition or failure of an impoundment,
refuse pile, or culm bank requiring emergency preventative action or
evacuation of an area.
16.  Inundation Accidents caused by inundation of a surface or underground mine by a liquid
(or semisolid) or a gas.
17.  Machinery Accidents related to the motion of machinery. Included are all electric and air-
powered tools and mining machinery such as drills, tuggers, winches, slushers,
draglines, power shovels, loaders, and compressors.
18.  Slip or Fall of Person
(from an elevation or on the
same level)
Accidents include slips or falls while getting on or off machinery and haulage
equipment that is not moving, and slips or falls while servicing or repairing
equipment or machinery.
19.  Stepping or Kneeling on
Object
Accidents are classified in this category only where the object stepped or
kneeled on contributed most directly to the accident.
20.  Striking or Bumping This classification is restricted to those accidents in which an individual, while
moving about, strikes or bumps an object, but is not handling material, using
hand tools, or operating equipment.
21.  Other Accidents not elsewhere classified.
Source: MSHA (1997)
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Table 2.  Blasting injuries in surface mines, 1978-98
Year
Coal mines Metal/nonmetal mines
Fatal Nonfatal Total Fatal Nonfatal Total
1978 0 19 19 2 21 23
1979 2 14 16 0 12 12
1980 1 14 15 2 16 18
1981 2 10 12 3 8 11
1982 1 5 6 2 6 8
1983 0 7 7 0 5 5
1984 1 16 17 3 18 21
1985 0 3 3 0 4 4
1986 3 9 12 0 8 8
1987 1 9 10 0 14 14
1988 0 11 11 0 9 9
1989 2 13 15 3 11 14
1990 2 6 8 3 13 16
1991 1 5 6 0 11 11
1992 1 8 9 3 3 6
1993 1 2 3 0 7 7
1994 1 7 8 2 8 10
1995 0 2 2 1 7 8
1996 0 4 4 1 6 7
1997 0 1 1 1 5 6
1998 0 2 2 0 8 8
Total 19 167 186 26 200 226
Source: Verakis & Lobb (2001)
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Table 3.  Trends in flyrock and lack of blast area security injuries in surface mining, 1978-98
Activity or cause
Fatal and nonfatal injuries
1978-81 1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998 Total
Lack of blast area security 51 28 43 25 17 3 167















 The numbers within the parenthesis indicate the flyrock and lack of blast area security injuries as a percentage of1
injuries reported in the Table 2 for the corresponding 4-year period.
Source: Verakis & Lobb (2001)
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• movement of explosive truck
• movement of service vehicles
• obstruction of visibility
• lightning
• securing access roads
• misfires
Task Factors
• examine driller’s log
• examine laser profile
• examine highwall
• examine bench top




• contact mine foreman
• clear blast area
• secure blast area
• connect lead-in line
• go to a blasting shelter
• sound warning signal
• fire the blast
• examine the blast site






• visual perception 
• load and blast in a hurry 
• overwork
• prior injury history
Figure 2.  List of factors involved in blasting
           Personal
          Factors
   Task 
Factors
                                        Environmental
                               Factors
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Appendix A.  Fatality case studies related to flyrock and/or blast area security (1990-1999)
The incidents are arranged chronologically for coal mines followed by nonmetal mines.
Case 1 - Coal Mine, Walker County, AL  On September 22, 1990, flyrock projected from a
surface coal mine blast fatally injured the owner of a logging company (MSHA, 1990c).  He was
in the process of preparing access roads for future logging operations and was outside the mine
property.
Fifty-four holes, in six rows, 22.9-cm diameter, 12.2-m deep, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern were
loaded with emulsion explosive.  Each hole contained about 392 kg of explosives.  The
stemming length was 3.0 m.  The pit area was cleared and the shot was fired.  The blast projected
flyrock about 275 m and fatally injured the victim.  Several large boulders, scattered over an area
near the accident site, were noticed.  The MSHA investigation report indicated that a blown out
shot caused the flyrock.  This incident emphasizes the importance of paying attention to task
factors such as blast design, highwall inspection, determination of the bounds of the blast area,
and blast area security. 
Case 2 - Coal Mine, Mingo County, WV  On February 1, 1992, a blaster was fatally injured in a
surface coal mine by a 43- by 89- by 22-cm flyrock (MSHA, 1992).  Eighty boreholes, 22.9-cm
in diameter, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern were loaded with 16,064 kg of explosives.  The stemming
length was 3.0 m.  Sixty-two holes were 9.1m deep and each hole was loaded with 212.3 kg of
bulk ANFO.  Eighteen holes were 6.1m deep and each was loaded with 159.2 kg of bulk ANFO. 
Drill cuttings were used for stemming. 
On the day of this incident, the blaster and helper loaded eighty holes.  Upon clearing the blast
area and securing access roads, the shot was fired from a distance of 457 m.  A misfire was
noticed and after 15 minutes, the blaster returned to the blast site, examined the shot area, and
reconnected the lead-in line in preparation of firing the remaining holes.  The blaster positioned
himself under a Ford 9000, 2-1/2-ton truck and fired the shot from a distance of 229 m.  Upon
firing the shot, the blaster was fatally injured by flyrock.  He was treated for collapsed lungs,
multiple rib fractures, fractured mandible, dislocated left shoulder, and serious head injuries.
The MSHA investigation report indicated that the blaster was within the limits of the blast area
and did not use a proper blasting shelter.  This tragedy could have been avoided by using a
proper blasting shelter.  The space under a truck should not be used as a blasting shelter.  This
incident underscores the importance of personal and task factors.
Case 3 - Coal Mine, Campbell County, TN  On June 4, 1993, a 16-year-old passenger in a car
driven by his parent on interstate 75 (I-75), was fatally injured by flyrock originating from an
overburden blast in a nearby coal mine (Shea & Clark, 1998).  The closest blasthole was within 
22.9 m of the Right of Way (RoW) and 68.6 m from the I-75 pavement.
Twenty-eight blastholes, in four rows, on a 5.5- by 5.5-m pattern, 18.4-cm diameter, were loaded
with ANFO.  Each hole contained 259.9 kg of explosive and was stemmed with 3.4 m of drill
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cuttings.  The length of explosive column in each hole was about 9.8 m.  Unlike previous blasts,
explosive charges were not decked during this blast.
The investigation report (Shea & Clark, 1998) indicated that this blast was not designed
according to the specifications approved in the permit document.  Instead of decking explosive
charges in two columns and priming separately, the entire charge was loaded in one column. 
Hole diameter and blast pattern used were different from the approved plan.  The I-75 traffic was
not monitored.  The presence of a 2.4-m thick layer of clay on the top of the sandstone
overburden was considered a contributory factor. 
The causative factors were single decking of holes instead of double decking on separate delays
and a change in the geology of the overburden.  Preventive measures should include paying close
attention to drillers’ log and watching for any abrupt changes in the geology or rock structure. 
Blast design parameters should not be changed without a critical review of its impact.  This
incident underscores the importance of task and environmental factors.  In addition, the I-75
traffic should have been temporarily stopped immediately prior to blasting.
Case 4 - Coal Mine, Greene County, IN  On April 25, 1994, a 34-year-old driller/loader was
fatally injured by flyrock in a surface coal mine (MSHA, 1994a).  Coal was mined from a 1.5-m
thick seam having a shale parting at the middle.  One hundred and seventeen holes, 17.1-cm
diameter, 3.4- m deep were drilled on a 3.4- by 3.4-m pattern.  Each hole was backfilled with
about 0.3 m of dirt and loaded with 19.4 kg of emulsion-type explosive.  The length of stemming
varied from 2.3 to 2.4 m.  There were nine rows with 13 holes per row.  Some of the holes
contained water. 
The blasting crew notified the superintendent of an impending blast and cleared other employees
from the pit area.  The victim and another employee working under the direction of the blaster
were about 72 m from the blast area.  Upon firing the blast, the victim was fatally injured by
flyrock.
The MSHA investigation report indicated that the accident was caused by failure to use an
adequate blasting shelter.  This incident emphasizes the importance of using proper blasting
shelters for employees whose presence is required in the blast area.  This incident focuses
attention to personal and task factors.
Case 5 - Coal Mine, Pike County, KY  On February 15, 1999, a 55-year-old area resident rode an
all-terrain vehicle (ATV) from his residence to an access trail leading to the mine site (MSHA,
1999a).  He parked his ATV about 30.5 m from the edge of the blast site and started walking
toward the blast site.  Shortly after he started walking, a blast was detonated.  Later, his body
was found close to the perimeter of the blast site.  Mining was conducted on privately-owned
land including land owned by the victim.
A total of 212 holes, 17.1-cm diameter, loaded with 5,900 kg of explosive, were detonated.  Of
these, 164 holes were 4.0 m deep, and 48 holes were 7.0 m deep.  The blastholes were drilled on
a 4.0- by 4.6-m pattern.  The blast area and the access trail leading to the blast area were
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examined about five minutes before the blast.  The MSHA investigation report indicated that
guards were not posted at the access trail, and the blaster did not have a clear view of the access
trail from the firing station.  A Ford F-250 pickup truck was equipped with two electro-
mechanical horns.  However, on the day of the incident only the low-pitch horn was operational
and the high-pitch horn was found to be disconnected.  The access trail was in a valley, and it
was probably difficult for the victim to hear the signal.
This incident underscores the need for effective blast area security and focuses attention
primarily on the task factors.
Case 6 - Nonmetal mine, Caldwell County, KY  On July 5, 1990, a blaster was fatally injured by
flyrock while standing in the open about 154 m from the blast site.  The blaster was standing on
the highwall about 61 m above the blastholes.  Flyrock measuring 23-by18-by13-cm and
weighing about 6.4 kg, traveled over the highwall and injured the blaster (MSHA, 1990a).
On the day of this incident, blasters were assigned to blast a toe round.  The toe round consisted
of 23 holes ranging in depth from 0.9 to 1.5 m.  The holes were loaded with 6.4 cm diameter
packaged explosive product.  A total of 79.8 kg of explosive, averaging 3.4 kg per hole, was
used. 
This incident could have been prevented by using a blasting shelter and emphasized the
importance of task factors.
Case 7 - Nonmetal Mine, Livingston County, IL  On July 11, 1990, flyrock from a limestone
quarry traveled about 284 m and fatally injured a resident who was mowing grass on his property
(MSHA, 1990b).
On the day of this incident, thirty-six holes in three rows, twelve holes per row, were loaded with
1,160 kg of ANFO.  The holes were 12.1-cm in diameter and 6.6-m deep.  The spacing and
burden were 4.1m and 2.7 m respectively.  The upper 1.5m of each hole was stemmed with drill
cuttings and crushed stone.  One of the holes near the center of the front row was found to be
overloaded. 
The MSHA investigation report indicated that an overloaded hole in the front row was a
contributory factor for this incident.  Overloading creates an imbalance between the available
explosive energy and the rock resistance.  Such situations can create problems in the front row of
blastholes.  A blaster should observe the rise of explosive column while loading a borehole to
control loss of powder in voids, mud seams, or crevices (Fletcher & D’Andrea, 1986).  If a void
is encountered, it should be filled with inert material (Dick, et al., 1983).  This incident focuses
attention to task factors.
Case 8 - Nonmetal Mine, Luna County, NM  On October 12, 1990, a visitor sustained severe
injuries and a drill/blast helper was fatally injured by flyrock in a surface silica flux mine
(MSHA, 1990d).  The visitor was hospitalized for broken ribs and internal injuries and the
drill/blast helper was pronounced dead.  The drill/blast helper had three days mining experience
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and had little training in blast hazard recognition.  The visitor wanted to take a photograph of the
blast.
The ore was mined by drilling and blasting from shallow multiple benches.  The mining
company used a blasting contractor for loading and firing the shots.  The blast round consisted of
49 holes, 7.6-cm diameter, 3.7-m deep, on a 1.8-m spacing.  Some of the holes were stemmed
with 0.6 m of drill cuttings.  Several holes were completely filled with ANFO.  A detonating
cord trunk line was used to tie each hole without any firing delay.  The trunk line was tied to a
cap and fuse assembly.  
The visitor and the drill/blast helper were about 46 m from the edge of the blast.  Upon firing the
shot, the drill/blast helper was fatally struck on the back side of his head.  The MSHA
investigation report indicated that poor blasting practice (such as, overcharging boreholes, lack
of stemming, and absence of delays) was exhibited during this shot.  The employee was not
properly trained and was too close to the blast.  This accident emphasizes the significance of
personal and task factors such as hazard recognition training, proper blast design, and
deployment of blasting shelters.
Case 9 - Nonmetal Mine, Madison County, IL  On May 23, 1994, a crane operator was fatally
injured by flyrock which struck him in the back (MSHA, 1994b).  He was 21 years old and had
1-1/2 months mining experience at this mine. Forty-one holes, 8.9 cm diameter, 3.7 m deep,
were loaded with ANFO.  The bench height was 3.4 m.  The length of stemming was about 0.9
m and crushed limestone was used for stemming.  The stemmed holes were covered with
blasting mats of 0.9-by 0.9-m size.  Pails containing crushed stone were placed over the mats.
On the day of this incident, the crane operator helped in stemming the holes, and placing blasting
mats over the holes.  The victim and the blaster moved to a top bench behind the blast and were
standing in the open about 37 m from the nearest blasthole.  Upon initiation of the blast one of
the holes threw flyrock toward the victim.  The MSHA investigation indicated that the crane
operator did not use a blasting shelter.  This incident emphasizes the importance of personal and
task factors.
Case 10 - Nonmetal Mine, Lancaster County, PA  On December 21, 1999, a 32-year-old
equipment operator was in a pickup truck guarding an access road to the blast site (MSHA,
1999b).  The pickup truck was about 244 m from the blast site.  Flyrock entered the cab through
the windshield and fatally struck the victim.  The victim had seven years mining experience as
an equipment operator at this mine.
The highwall face was about 15.2 m high and the depth of holes ranged between 14.9 and
16.5 m.  The blast round consisted of 22 holes drilled on a 4.9- by 4.9-m pattern.  Approximately
4,352 kg of explosives were used in this round and the length of stemming varied from 2.7 to
11.0 m.  The weight of explosive used in each blasthole was not recorded.  Some of the holes
were slanted up to 25° toward the highwall.  This was done to compensate for irregularities in
the highwall face.  Drill records indicated that several blastholes were broken and contained
voids.  The MSHA investigation indicated that at least one of the blastholes blew out causing
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flyrock.  This incident emphasizes several issues, such as, blast design, loading of voids, burden,
confinement, and record keeping which are task factors.
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